[60groszyzawpis]

Odnośnie rosnącego napięcia pomiędzy tworzącymi się obozami rebeliantów w Syrii, o których pisałem ostatnio. Tekst C. Listera, za którym można nie przepadać, ale trzeba przyznać, że w sytuacji politycznej rebeliantów orientuje się jak mało kto:

JFS attacks Ahrar al-Sham in #idlib:

JFS/AQ militants launched a series of seemingly coordinated assaults this morning on Ahrar al-Sham headquarters, checkpoints and a border crossing in the town of Khirbet al-Joz, along #turkey's border with #syria. Additional attacks were reported on Ahrar al-Sham positions in Bdama, Darkoush, al-Zayniya and outside Jisr al-Shughour. Casualties were reported and a number of Ahrar prisoners were taken.

This is not the first time JFS (& previously, Jabhat al-Nusra) has attacked Ahrar al-Sham in #idlib, nor other opposition groups in northern #syria. And JFS's reasoning for today's events has been the same as previously: 'you took some of us prisoner.' On this occasion, JFS accused Ahrar of holding an Iraqi JFS commander in one of its prisons.

However, the purpose of these attacks appears to have been far more strategic, and calculated. Tension has been rising in Idlib for several weeks and rumors have been circling about a possible Turkish/Russian-backed air campaign against JFS across the province. Opposition groups close to #turkey have fallen under suspicion for being potential components of such an operation. A number of inter-linked dynamics are likely to have contributed towards today's events:

Ahrar al-Sham continues to accuse JFS of harboring "#isis cells" after the group consumed Jund al-Aqsa in October 2016. Most recently, Ahrar al-Sham leader Ali al-Omar publicly accused JFS and its leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani of protecting an organization that was (a) operating on behalf of #isis and (b) was responsible for a series of assassination attacks on Ahrar commanders.

A JFS-led initiative aimed at uniting the Jaish al-Fateh alliance in Idlib and Aleppo comprehensively failed in January 2017, in large part due to Ahrar al-Sham's refusal to take part without the inclusion of a broader spectrum of #syria's opposition. Instead, a majority of Ahrar's Shura Council (15:8) voted in favor of pursuing unity with mainstream opposition groups (aside: this has also failed). This has seen JFS and its supporters launching a public attack campaign against Ahrar, accusing it of being a puppet of foreign powers (namely #turkey, which already stands accused of 'selling' #aleppo to #russia).

Ahrar al-Sham remains structurally unstable and internally divided. Significant decisions have proven immensely hard to make, as two rival 'currents' within the group compete for influence. The more 'progressive' of the two currents is perceived as being close (or subservient) to #turkey; which raises concerns within JFS that it faces a potentially dangerous competitor from within a group long assumed to be a close ally. On the surface therefore, one dynamic to note is that Khirbet al-Joz and its surrounding countryside was territory that had long been controlled by hardline Palestinian Ahrar al-Sham commander Abu Khuzaymah - a figure well known for his pro-AQ leanings and who has been linked to a number of pro-Nusra/JFS conspiracies since at least mid-2015. It remains entirely possible that Abu Khuzaymah helped set the conditions for this JFS power play, to weaken Ahrar al-Sham's border control and to minimize #turkey's capacity to hold leverage against the opposition that could one day challenge JFS's presence in #idlib.

JFS has found itself targeted by an increasingly intense series of U.S. drone strikes in #idlib, since late-2016. Over 55 JFS fighters and several very senior leaders have been killed in these strikes since January 2017. While only minimally public, some prominent figures within JFS have accused elements within Ahrar al-Sham of collusion with 'foreign powers' over the targeting of AQ figures in #idlib.

The issue of whether or not to attend the #astana talks on January 23 has been a sensitive issue within #syria's armed opposition and JFS has been quietly threatening any group who agreed to #!$%@? with certain unspecified 'consequences.' Many opposition groups refused to attend #astana, including several prominent Free Syrian Army factions. An Ahrar al-Sham statement yesterday announced it too would decline to go to #astana and one of its 7 reasons was not to isolate anyone else who refused to #!$%@?, including JFS. Though some interpreted that to be a staunch defense of JFS, it was interpreted as an insufficiently strong rejection of a process JFS considers 'treasonous.'

Substantial public pressure in #idlib city recently forced Jaish al-Fateh to renounce control over service provision and civil governance activities to an elected civil council (the election was held on Jan 17). This was interpreted as a weakening of JFS' governing project in #idlib. Jihadi hardliners in the province accuse Ahrar al-Sham of having supported the push for the transfer of authority, as Ahrar-linked civil bodies look set to benefit politically and financially from the move.

#syria #turcjawsyrii #rosjawsyrii #nusra

[m.....r]

Su-25

@60groszyzawpis: powaznie czy troll? lister o niczym nie ma pojecia. to jest tylko tuba arabow z zatoki perskiej. przeciez on nawet w syrii nie byl i z zadnymi jihadystami nie rozmawal nigdy. wszyscy z pojeciem jada po nim przy kazdej okazji :D jakim cudem ktos moze myslec ze lister ma pojecie o wojnie w syrii? :D jihadijulian moze tez jest ekspertem ? :D

[60groszyzawpis]

@marek-kczr: czytanie ze zrozumieniem? Sam za nim nie przepadam ale właśnie z tego powodu co pisałeś (tuba, PR rebeliantów) gość ma dostep do informacji dotyczących wewnętrznych spraw rebeliantów.

[m.....r]

@60groszyzawpis: raczej udaje ze ma. jak tylko sie odzywa na tematy ktorymi inni sie zajmuja to jest kompromitowany. jego wiarygodnosc jest zerowa. o jihadystach moze pisac duzo bo tak naprawde nie ma jak tego zweryfikowac. dziwne ze skoro wiesz ze lister nie jest wiarygodny i pisze bzdury to dlaczego akurat ma byc wiarygodny i pisac prawde na temat wew. spraw dzihadystow? nie ma sensu co mowisz. dostep listera do infromacji sprowadza

[bombastick]

. dziwne ze skoro wiesz ze lister nie jest wiarygodny i pisze bzdury to dlaczego akurat ma byc wiarygodny i pisac prawde na temat wew. spraw dzihadystow

@marek-kczr: bo pasuje pod tezę, i jego postrzeganie konfliktu, wielu tu tak ma( ͡° ͜ʖ ͡°)

[60groszyzawpis]

@marek-kczr: Przeczytałeś tekst czy tylko czepiasz się bo napisałem coś co Ci nie pasuje? To wszystko co tam pisze Lister, to są znane informacje, które przewijają się już od jakiego czasu z różnych źródeł (w tym nawet potwierdzone prze Pentagon jak np ataki dronów na JFS). Nie widzę tam niczego co by mogło być wymyślone na kolanie i czego bym nie słyszał już z innych źródeł. Chcesz powiedzieć, że to co

[m.....r]

ma dostep do informacji dotyczących wewnętrznych spraw rebeliantów.

@60groszyzawpis: chcialem powiedziezc ze jego zrodla to anglojezyczne twitty jihadystow. nie ma zadnego specjalnego dostepu. bardziej dezinformuje niz informuje:)